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Domestic Relations
BY LOUISE GRAHAM*
INTRODUCTION
In the decade since Kentucky's adoption of the Uniform Mar-
riage and Divorce Act,' the state's courts have faced the task of
interpreting it in domestic relations litigation. This past year was
no exception. A number of problems before Kentucky courts
were recurrent issues. For example, the divisibility of education-
al degrees acquired by one spouse again required court assess-
ment.2 Similarly, issues surrounding both maintenance and child
support reappeared. 3 These recurrent issues, along with new
issues feqturing court solution, heavily burdened trial and appel-
late courts. This Survey will discuss court resolutions of signif-
icant problems in the areas of marital property, maintenance
and child support, enforcement oP judgments, child custody, pa-
ternity and marriage regulation.
I. MARITAL PROPERTY
A. Antenuptial agreements
For more than fifty years Kentucky courts have distinguished
between antenuptial agreements providing for the waiver of the
rights of a surviving spouse and those that provide for support or
Associate Professor of Law, Umversity of Kentucky. B.A. 1965, J.D. 1977, Umver-
sity of Texas. The author expresses her appreciation to Janet Jakubowicz, J.D. 1982, Uni-
versity of Kentucky, for her editorial assistance.
I The Kentucky General Assembly adopted substantial portions of the Uniform
Marriage and Divorce Act in 1972. See Ky. REv. STAT. §§ 403.010-.350 (Bobbs-Merril
Cum. Supp. 1982) [hereinafter cited as KRS]. In 1980, the state legislature adopted the
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act. See KRS §§ 403.400-.630 (Cum. Supp. 1982).
Although Kentucky statutes on custody jurisdiction substantially resembled the Act prior
to its adoption, some significant provisions were deleted. See Turley v. GnIffin, 508
S.W.2d 764 (Ky. 1974) (home state not clearly defined by Act).
2 For discussions of earlier litigation of this issue see Crone, Domestic Relations, 69
KY. L.J. 581 (1980-81); Graham & Jakubowicz, Domestic Relations, 70 Ky. L.J. 425
(1981-82); Hams & Donoho, Domestic relations, 68 Ky. L.J. 753 (1979-80).
3 For discussions of these issues, see the Surveys cited in note 2 supra.
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property division upon divorce. 4 Although the former have been
consistently upheld absent proof of fraud or of other unfairness, 5
the latter have been branded as void contracts prohibited by state
public policy." In Jackson v. Jackson,7 the Kentucky Supreme
Court continued this distinction, permitting enforcement in a di-
vorce context of an antenuptial agreement for the lifetime sup-
port of the wife because it found that the agreement was made
without reference to the event of divorce.
Juanita and Carl Jackson had a rather typical second mar-
riage.8 Both parties were employed at the time of their marriage.
Juanita owned a substantial farm; Carl owned real estate. Dur-
ing the marriage, Carl sold both farm equipment and cattle. In
both instances he received proceeds of the sales for his personal
disposition. When Carl's real estate was sold, however, Juanita
did not receive proceeds. Seven years into the marriage Carl left
Kentucky with a new pickup (purchased by the parties but regis-
tered in his name) and $30,000. 9 On divorce the trial court gave
effect to the parties' antenuptial agreement and found that $300
per month was "decent support." 10 The court of appeals over-
ruled the trial court's decision, concluding that the agreement
was invalid because it encouraged divorce or separation." The
Supreme Court disagreed because it viewed the agreement as an
4 Stratton v. Wilson, 185 S.W 522 (Ky. 1916). Recently, the Kentucky Supreme
Court referred to the rule as hornbook law. Jackson v. Jackson, 626 S.W.2d 630, 631 (Ky.
1981).
5 See, e.g., Lipski v. Lspski, 510 S.W.2d 6 (Ky. 1974); Harlin v. Harlin, 87 S.W.2d
(Ky. 1935); Fish v. Fish, 212 S.W 586 (Ky. 1919); Stephens v. Stephens, 205 S.W 573
(Ky. 1918); Settles v. Settles, 114 S.W 303 (Ky. 1908); Forwood v. Forwood, 5 S.W 361
(Ky. 1887).
6 Stratton v. Wilson, 185 S.W at 522.
7 626 S.W.2d at 630.
8 In a number of cases upholding a spouse's waiver of statutory rights when a mar-
nage is terminated by death, Kentucky courts have considered the fact that the marriage
was a second one, a strong reason to uphold the waiver. See Harlin v. Harlin, 87 S.W.2d
at 939; Fish v. Fish, 212 S.W at 587; Stephens v. Stephens, 205 S.W at 574. Dissolution
of a second marriage where both parties bring substantial assets to the marriage is likely to
be difficult, whether the marriage is dissolved by death or divorce. This is particularly
true in light of the Kentucky rule that requres a party seeking the return of non-marital
property brought into the marriage to trace that property into specific assets. See Brunson
v. Brunson, 569 S.W.2d 173, 176 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
9 626 S.W.2d at 630.
10 Id.
1 Id.
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"arm's length" transaction that did not mention and was not de-
pendent upon subsequent dissolution. 2 Thus, the agreement
stood because it did not mention divorce or separation.
Although the Jackson resolution seems fair, 13 the Court's reli-
ance upon the agreement's failure to mention divorce or separa-
tion is a technical one that does little to illuminate the policy con-
cerns that prohibit recognition of such agreements. 4 More
importantly, the decision fails to address the issue of whether
policies relevant in 1916, when Kentucy courts first distinguished
between enforceable and non-enforceable antenuptial agree-
ments, have continued vitality, particularly in light of the
changes in Kentucky divorce law since that time.
The Jackson Court relied upon Stratton v. Wilson,'15 the 1916
case validating an antenuptial agreement to waive dower rights
upon the death of the husband in spite of a separation provision
in the agreement for a limited settlement should the marriage be
dissolved by divorce. The Stratton distinction, permitting ante-
nuptial agreements that provide for the waiver of statutory
shares in the event that the marriage is dissolved by death and in-
21 ld. at 632.
13 The facts of the Jackson case show that Carl Jackson had dissipated a substantial
portion of Juanita's separate assets. Id. at 630. When one party dissipates marital property
Kentucky appellate courts have permitted trial courts to treat the dissipated property as
though it existed, to compute the divisible property including the lost assets, and to award
the dissipating spouse the previously expended assets. See Barriger v. Barriger, 514 S.W.2d
114, 115 (Ky. 1974). See also Faulkner v. Faulkner, 582 S.W.2d 292 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979);
Reaney v. Reaney, 505 S.W.2d 338 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974).
14 See text accompanying notes 15-18 infra for a discussion of the policies behind the
rule. The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act makes no specific provision for antenuptial
agreements other than the provision that separate property may include property subject
to a valid agreement of the parties. UNW. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE AcT § 307, 9A U.L.A.
144 (1971) (commissioner's comments). Some states that have adopted the Act recognize
such agreements if the agreement is valid in the state m which it is made but do not permit
such agreements to bar trial court discretion in dividing marital property. Compare In re
Marriage of Franks, 542 P.2d 845 (Colo. 1975) with In re Marriage of Thompson, 568
P.2d 98 (Colo. Ct. App. 1977). Some community property states permit antenuptial
agreements to abrogate community property rights during marriage. See Spector v. Spec-
tor, 531 P.2d 176 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1975); In re Marriage of Dawley, 551 P.2d 323 (Cal.
1976); Sarpy v. Sarpy, 323 So. 2d 851 (La. Ct. App. 1975). Wisconsin permits antenuptial
agreements by statute. See Wis. REv. STAT. ANN. § 247.555(11) (1981).
Is 185 S.W. at 522. In Sousley v. Sousley, 614 S.W.2d 942 (Ky. 1981), the Court de-
clined to consider reversal of the Stratton rule because the issue was not clearly presented
to it.
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validating those agreements that take effect should the marriage
be dissolved by divorce, is grounded in the traditional view that
the latter class of agreements either inherently de-stabilize mar-
riage by permitting persons who are entering into a marriage to
contemplate divorce or promote divorce by making it advanta-
geous to one of the parties to procure a divorce.16 At the time
Stratton was decided, Kentucky's divorce scheme generally re-
quired that the party seeking a divorce demonstrate that he or
she was entitled to a divorce based upon the "fault" of the other
party to the marriage. 7 Further, the issue of fault had some bear-
ing upon a party's entitlement to alimony. 18 Court reluctance to
uphold agreements that barred a fault-free party from support or
granted it to a party substantially at fault is understandable in
light of such a marriage dissolution system. Whether the public
policy underlying that fault-based system remains viable today
raises other questions.
In 1972 Kentucky enacted portions of the Uniform Marriage
and Divorce Act.' 9 Under the marriage dissolution system en-
visioned by that Act, the issue of fault has largely been elim-
inated. ° Divorce is granted solely upon the ground of irretriev-
16 185 S.W at 522. See generally R. PELLI, KENTUCKY FAMILY LAw § 13.8 (1969).
17 At the time Stratton was decided, only two of the statutory grounds for divorce
were not related to fault. 1915 Ky. Stat. § 2117 (Baldwin) (impotency or malformation
preventing sexual intercourse or lack of cohabitation for five years). Accord Clark v.
Clark, 53 S.W 644 (Ky. Ct. App. 1899). Other grounds for divorce-such as abandon-
ment for more than one year, living in adultery, condemnation for a felony, the conbeal-
ment or contraction of a loathsome disease, force, fraud or duress, or joining certain reli-
gious societies requiring a renunciation of the marriage covenant-were all statutorily
fault-based since they granted a divorce to the party not at fault. 1915 Ky. Stat. § 2117
(Baldwin). Additionally, habitual drunkenness was a statutory ground for divorce if the
complaimng spouse was not "in like fault." Id. A husband could be granted a divorce
when the wife was pregnant by another man without the husband's knowledge at the time
of the marriage or where the wife was either lewd or lascivious without the necessity of
proof that he was not in like fault. Id.
18 The statute allowed alimony to a wife if she did not have sufficient estate of her
own. 1893 Ky. Stat. § 2122. Kentucky courts interpreted the statute to provide alimony to
the wife in some cases in which the divorce was awarded to the husband, implying fault
on the wife's part, as long as the husband was also at fault and the wife was not guilty of
moral delinquency. Green v. Green, 153 S.W 775 (Ky. 1913). See also Pore v. Pore, 50
S.W 681 (Ky. 1899); Laceyv. Lacey, 23 S.W 673 (Ky. 1893).
19 See note 1 supra for a reference to the statute.
2 UW. MARMAGE AND DIVORCE ACT. 9A U.L.A. 91-94 (1971) (commissioner's pref-
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able breakdown. 2' Both property division and a spouse's initial
entitlement to maintenance must be determined without refer-
ence to the fault of either party.2 Spouses are entitled'to make
either separation agreements or divorce agreements settling
issues of property division and adult support.2 The court reviews
such agreements under an "unconscionability" standard,2 leav-
ing the parties wide latitude to settle their own affairs. Further,
the property division portion of the statute refers specifically to
the possibility of such agreements.25 In addition, the current
divorce statute accepts both the autonomy of the spouses in
arranging their own affairs and the view that amicable settle-
ment of marital disputes is preferable to protracted and harmfullitigation.21
Although acceptance of antenuptial agreements would not
necessarily pose to the current system the same problem of dis-
ruption which was posed to a fault-based system, two other
problems with regard to such agreements remain. The first is the
traditional view that antenuptial agreements promote-divorce.27
Adopting an irretrievable breakdown standard for marriage dis-
solution does not mean that a state loses all interest in discour-
aging divorce. Even with an essentially "no fault" system, Ken-
tucky retains a stated interest in strengthening and preserving the
atory note).
21 KRS §§ 403.150, .170 (Cum. Supp. 1982).
2 The trial court is directed to divide the marital property without regard to marital
misconduct. KRS § 403.190(1) (Cum. Supp. 1982). Although fault is not a consideration
in whether maintenance is to be awarded initially, it may influence the amount of mainte-
nance. Chapman v. Chapman, 498 S.W.2d 134 (Ky. 1973). Similarly, child custody de-
terminations are to be made without regard to parental misconduct that does not affect
the parent-child relationship. KRS § 403.270(2).
23 KRS § 403.180(1) (Cum. Supp. 1982).
24 Unconscionability has been interpreted to require more than proof of a "bad bar-
gain." Peterson v. Peterson, 583 S.W.2d 707 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979) (husband's agreement to
pay $700 out of his $934 monthly net income does not render agreement unconscionable
even though such an award would have amounted to an abuse of trial court discretion).
25 See KRS § 403.190(2)(d) (Cum. Supp. 1982).
2 See KRS § 403.110(2), (3) (Cum. Supp. 1982).
27 Stratton v. Wilson, 185 S.W at 522. See generally R. PaMrUi, supra note 16, at §
1982-83]
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marital institution.2 As a factual matter it is not clear that ante-
nuptial agreements actually promote divorce; despite Kentucky's
prohibition against such agreements, the number of marriages
dissolved by divorce has risen steadily. 2Rather than continuing
an empirically unjustified blanket prohibition against such
agreements, the Jackson court might have reexamined the policy
behind refusing to enforce such agreements. In both Stratton and
the cases discussing waiver of spousal rights when the marriage is
dissolved by death, the underlying theme is one of concern with
the fairness of the agreement. 30 The state's interest in stable mar-
riage relationships and in promoting amicable and fair settle-
ments when those relationships are dissolved dictates that the
state be able to strike down agreements that unfairly advantage
or disadvantage one of the parties should the marriage be dis-
solved by divorce. The Stratton rule, however, is not necessary to
effect such a policy. That rule strikes down all antenuptial agree-
ments relating to divorce or separation without regard to the rel-
ative fairness of such agreements.
The second problem, then, is how to set standards for deter-
mining when an agreement should be unenforceable because it
unfairly disadvantages one of the parties to the marriage. Both
the divorce statute and case law concerning agreements to waive
dower rights support a rule requiring that the agreement meet a
two-point test. 31 First, the agreement should be fair at the time it
2'The state's continued interest in strengthening the marriage institution despite its
adoption of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act is demonstrated by the fact that the
court must make an independent determination of irretrievable breakdown. See KRS §
403.170 (Cum. Supp. 1982); Laffoose v. Laffosse, 564 S.W.2d 220 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
Additional concern for the marriage is demonstrated by provisions for conciliation confer-
ences although such conferences are not mandatory. See Putnam v. Fanning, 495 S.W.2d
175 (Ky. 1973); KRS § 403.170.
2 In fact, the rate of divorces and annulments in Kentucky has increased almost
50% since 1965. The rate of divorce per 1,000 people in Kentucky was 2.6 in 1965, but
had risen to 4.5 per 1,000 people by 1979. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, BURiEAU
OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 82 (102d ed. 1981).
30 See 185 S.W at 522.
31 The divorce statute supports the two-point test for two reasons. First, since the
statute requires the court to interpret the Act in light of the reality of marital experience it
[Vol. 71
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is made. Both parties should be fully informed of the assets held
by each and the rights normally accruing from the marital
relationship. 32 The parties should be capable of using that infor-
mation to make a reasonably intelligent decision as to whether
the agreement is in their interest. 33 Neither party should be al-
lowed to overreach the other. Second, the court should not en-
force such an agreement if, at the time enforcement is sought, it
is unfair to one of the parties in view of circumstances that were
unknown and unanticipated at the time the agreement was made
and that are so substantial and continuing as to render the agree-
ment unconscionable. 34
Adoption of the proposed standards for antenuptial agree-
ments would advance the state's policy of strengthening mar-
riages by promoting pre-nuptial discussion of economic prob-
is unlikely that it precludes some consideration of divorce even at the inception of a mar-
nage. See KRS § 403.110(5) (Cur. Supp. 1982). If agreements regarding divorce can be
made, they should not be subject to a higher standard than the unconscionability standard
for separation and property settlement agreements. See KItS § 403.180. Case law regard-
ing agreements to waive statutory rights on the death of one spouse traditionally used the
suggested test. See note 5 supra for a list of the cases.
32 Compare Lipski v. Lapski, 510 S.W.2d at 6 (agreement upheld) with Simpson v.
Simpson's Ex'rs, 23 S.W 361 (Ky. 1893) (husband a shrewd businessman whose estate
consisted of intangibles; wife was not informed of extent of estate; agreement subsequently
set aside).
3 Occasionally, spouses have claimed they could not make an intelligent decision be-
cause they were separated from persons who might have given them advice. Forwood v.
Forwood, 5 S.W at 362. Where there is no disparity in the parties' intelligence and one
spouse did not actually prevent the other from obtaining advice, courts have generally
upheld the agreements. Id. at 364.
34 Neither spouse should be charged with unpredictable events. For example, a
spouse who has contracted a debiliating illness should not be bound by an agreement not
to seek support. Under the proposed rule, indiscriminate use of antenuptial agreements
should not result in substantial disregard of the maintenance statute, KItS § 403.200
(Cum. Supp. 1982). Neither the property divson provision, KItS § 403.190 (Cur. Supp.
1982), nor the maintenance statute, KRS § 403.200 (Cum. Supp. 1982), preclude the rec-
ognition of antenuptial agreements. The maintenance statute assumes that maintenance
will not be awarded in every case. The proposed requirement would prevent an antenup-
tial agreement from operating as a bar to the use of maintenance in those cases in which
the court deemed maintenance appropriate despite an agreement to the contrary. See
Ferry v. Ferry, 586 S.W.2d 782 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979) (antenuptial agreement signed under
mistaken assumptions cannot bar maintenance claim). The standard should be familiar to
trial courts since it is the standard for modification of maintenance. See KICS S 403.250.
KENTUCKy LAW JouRNAL
lems, since such problems are a primary factor in many divorces.
This could be particularly important for second marriages where
both parties bring significant assets to the marriage. The stan-
dards would not promote divorce since neither party could use an
agreement that is unfair either at the time of malng or at the
time of enforcement to his or her advantage. Finally, the stan-
dards would be familiar to trial courts since they combine the
standards used when agreements are enforced at the death of one
of the spouses and with those used when modification of mainte-
nance is sought. It is unfortunate that the Supreme Court in
Jackson chose not to reexamine the policies underlying Stratton.
Had the Court done so, it might have proposed a rule that would
have been more consistent with present public policy as expressed
by current legislation rather than continuing to give life to an ob-
solete public policy.
B. Educational Degrees and Professional Licenses
The second major type of marital property dispute faced by
the appellate courts in the past year was the continuing problem
of compensating one spouse for his or her contribution to the ed-
ucational advancement of the other spouse.-" In 1979 the court of
appeals ruled in Inman v. Inman (Inman I) that a spouse not
otherwise entitled to maintenance might recover the amount
spent for direct support and school expenses during the period of
education, plus reasonable interest and adjustment for infla-
tion.o Recent appellate court decisions address this problem but
the outcome of the cases is unclear.
In a second appeal from the trial court's further holdings in
'5 For prior discussions of cases on this issue, see Graham & Jakubowicz and Harris
& Donoho, supra note 2.
3 578 S.W.2d 266, 269 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979) (Inman 1). Since the Inman I decision,
courts of other states have considered similar problems dealing with compensation for
spousal contribution to an educational degree or license. Although some courts have fol-
lowed Inman Is suggestion that compensation be valued according to the cost of the edu-
cation (In re Sullivan, 8 FAm. L. REP. (BNA) 2165 (1982) (dicta); DeLa Rosa v. DeLa
Rosa, 309 N.W.2d 755, 759 (Mian. 1981)), others have adopted different methods of valu-
ation. See Lesman v. Lesman, 442 N.Y.S.2d 955 (Sup. Ct. 1981) (New York medical li-
cense not divisible, but wife's contribution to education may be considered in awarding
alimony and equitable share of marital estate); In re Marriage of Lundberg, 318 N.W.2d
918 (Wis. 1982) (wife who put husband through medical school may be compensated by
lump sum maintenance award payable in installments).
[Vol. 71
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Inman, the court of appeals held in Inman 113 1 that the spousal
contribution compensable under Inman I may not be measured
by the increased earning capacity of the degree holder and is re-
stricted to direct contributions made by the non-degree holding
spouse for support and school expenses.a8 In Moss v. Moss 39 the
court of appeals directed that the non-degree holding spouse be
compensated for contributing to the acquisition of a pharmacy
degree, even though the non-degree holding spouse also was en-
titled to compensation under Inman I while in Inman If it
limited the basis for compensation.
On the appeal of Inman II, the Kentucky Supreme Court
ruled that the court of appeals' first decision, holding the license
to practice dentistry marital property, was the law of the case
and could not be redetermined upon a second appeal.40 The for-
mula posited by the Court to be used in placing a value on an
educational degree implies that the court of appeals' first deci-
sion properly allowed the Inman trial court to consider John In-
man's future earning capacity. 41 However, in an effort to provide
guidance to both trial and appellate courts, the Supreme Court
spoke to the issue of the educational degree as marital property.
The Court first noted that in its view the degree was not marital
property.42 Nevertheless, the Court went on to state that were the
issue before it, it would adopt a formula measured by the non-
degree holder spouse's contributions toward living expenses, ed-
ucational costs and the potential for increase in future earning
capacity made possible by the degree. 43
Because the real stake in litigation similar to Inman has been
the ability to reach future earnings, the Court's statement is like-
ly to raise more questions than it solves. To say that the degree is
not property is simply a matter of semantics. The non-degree
37 Inman v. Inman, (Inman I1) No. 81-CA-936-MR, 29 KY. L. SuMM. 4, at 3 [herein-
after cited as KLS] (Ky. Ct. App. 1982), reversed on other grounds, No. 82-SC-266-DG,
29 KLS 14, at 12 (Ky. Nov. 23, 1982).
U 29 KLS4, at4.
3 639 S.W.2d 370 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982), Mrs. Moss received a maintenance award of
$150 per month for 18 months.
40 29 KLS 14, at 12.
41 Id. at 13.
42 Id.
4 3 Id. (emphasis added).
1982-83]
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holder's ability to reach potential future earnings will make the
name placed upon the award irrelevant. The outcome is parti-
cularly unfortunate because the Supreme Court's opinion simply
restates the case law from other states. The Court's failure to
examine the Kentucky statute closely and to explain its reasomng
leaves litigants with an unclear rule unsupported by explanation.
In Moss v. Moss the court of appeals both restricted and ex-
panded the Inman I doctrine. The Moss court went to some
trouble to distinguish the divisible pharmacy degree, the non-di-
visible license to practice pharmacy and the non-divisible prac-
tice of the pharmacist. 44 Although the court found that the de-
gree required compensation under the principles of Inman I, it
ruled that neither the license nor the practice gave rise to an
added award. The court regarded both the license and the prac-
tice as representations of a mere potential to earn.45 It stated that
the practice was "no more than a futuristic hope" and expressed
concern that its inclusion in any scheme of property division
would force division of an asset that might never materialize.48
The Moss court seems to have interpreted Inman I so as to
preclude the valuation of a spouse's contribution to educational
advancement by increased earning capacity. 47 A number of
cogent arguments exist for refusing to so value the spouse's contri-
bution. First, the property division statute could be interpreted
to exclude division of future earning capacity because it requires
division of property acquired during the marriage.48 In the con-
text of real estate owned by one party before the marriage but
subject to a mortgage paid bn after the marriage, Kentucky
courts have had to consider the time at which acquisition of
property has occurred. 49 Courts have held that such property was
non-marital by virtue of acquisition before the marriage only to
44639 S.W.2d at 374.
4s Id. The court in Moss also noted that academic scholarships were non-marital
property. Loans to finance education were to be regarded as marital property contribu-
tions to the extent that marital funds were used to repay them. Id. at 375.
46 Id. at 374.
47 But see Levy v. Levy, 397 A.2d 374 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1978).
48 KRS § 403.190(2) (Cum. Supp. 1982). Although the degree may be acquired dur-
ing the marriage, much of the value it represents will not be so acquired.
49 See Robinson v. Robinson, 569 S.W.2d 178, 181 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
[Vol. 71
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the extent of the equity owned by the spouse claiming a non-mar-
ital interest at the time of the marriage. 0 Like equity in a home,
earning capacity is not acquired at one point in time.51 In fact the
earning capacity of a degree holder will be augmented after the
marriage ceases, raising problems of dividing an asset not ac-
quired during the marriage. Second, valuing spousal contribu-
tion to educational advancement according to future earning
capacity is objectionable because it binds the degree holding
spouse to his or her occupation and imposes upon him or her re-
quirements of success that may be unrealistic. 52 In addition, valu-
ation by future earning capacity could emphasize the status as-
pect of the marriage too much. While spouses of medical stu-
dents may feel that the circumstances of their marriage entitle
them to maintain a lifestyle commensurate with what they
would have enjoyed had the marriage continued, the marital
property statute does not permit status considerations in deter-
mining whether an asset is divisible marital property.53 Under
Kentucky's current statute, status considerations such as the
duration of the marriage s and the lifestyle it would have af-
forded the parties s are relevant in determining the amount of
divisible property to be awaraed or the amount of maintenance
but they should not be used to determine initial divisibility. 0
50 See Newman v. Newman, 597 S.W.2d 137, 138 (Ky. 1980); Brandenburg v.
Brandenburg, 617 S.W.2d 871, 872 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981); Woosnam v. Woosnam, 587
S.W.2d 262,264 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
51 Of course, future earning capacity mn divorce cases can be valued at a particular
point in time much as it is in wrongful death cases. See Levy v. Levy, 397 .2d at 374.
Speculation about future earning capacity is necessary when the earner is dead m order to
provide any recovery. Further, such speculation can hardly tie the dead earner to an occu-
pation. Thus, the concerns present in divorce are absent in wrongful death situations.5 2 Moss v. Moss, 659 S.W.2d at 374.
5 The considerations under the marital property statute are the time of acqusition
and the manner of acquisition. KRtS § 403.190(2)(a)-(e) (Cum. Supp. 1982).
54 KRS § 403.190(1)(c) (Cum. Supp. 1982).
0 KRS § 403.200(2)(c), (d) (Cum. Supp. 1982).
56 The problem of divisibility of degrees and licenses illustrates the practical diffi-
culty with certain aspects of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act. In theory, the Act
recognizes each spouse as a contributor to the marital partnership. See KBS §
403.190(l)(a) (Cum. Supp. 1982) (recognizing the contribution of a homemaker spouse).
1982-83]
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One problematic aspect of the Moss decision is the court's
lengthy discussion of the "practice" of pharmacy. If the court's
meaning is that no valuation of the future earnings of a practice
is permissible, the discussion of the practice simply reinforces its
refusal to adopt future earning capacity as a method of valu-
ation. If, on the other hand, the court's discussion is interpreted
to mean that a spouse with a practice has no divisible assets, the
result will be unfortunate. Businesses begun during marriage are
commonly valued as marital property and are at least theoret-
ically subject to division.57 A blanket distinction between a com-
mercial enterprise such as a hardware store and a professional
practice raises numerous problems. Both types of enterprise may
have assets such as accounts receivable or goodwill regarded as
too speculative for division.-8 Nevertheless each has some assets
subject to current valuation without regard to the overly specula-
tive assets and excluding the future earning capacity of the busi-
When a divorce occurs, the marital assets should be divided and maintenance awarded
only if a spouse cannot meet his or her needs through div1d~d property or appropriate em-
ployment. KRS § 403.200(1) (Cum. Supp. 1982). Where one spouse puts another through
advanced education and divorce occurs soon thereafter, however, there often are few
assets to divide. Inman v. Inman, 578 S.W.2d at 266; In re Marriage of Lundberg, 318
N.W.2d at 918. Additionally, one spouse in such a case may seek compensation from the
other based upon an unfulfilled. agreement for reciprocal advancement. See Roberto v.
Brown, 318 N.W.2d 358 (Wis. 1982).
'7 See, e.g., Culver v. Culver, 572 S.W.2d 617 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978) (corporation's
value included as marital property); Browning v. Browning, 551 S.W.2d 823 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1977) (corporate shares are marital property). See also In re Marriage of Smith, 427
N.E.2d 1239 (ill. 1981) (office and rental property are marital); In re Marriage of White,
424 N.E.2d 421 (M1. Ct. App. 1981) (trial court must make valuation of dental corporation
for purposes of distributing marital property). A decision that a business is marital proper-
ty need not result in division of the business. It merely recognizes that the business is part
of the marital estate and requires an offsetting award to the other spouse. Clark v. Clark,
487 S.W.2d 272 (Ky. 1972).
8 See Johnson v. Johnson, 254 N.W.2d 198 (Wis. 1977) (accounts receivable too
speculative to divide). But see In re Marriage of Lukens, 558 P.2d 279 (Wash. Ct. App.
1976) (business goodwill is a divisible asset); In re Marriage of Fortier, 109 Cal. Rptr. 915
(Cal. Ct. App. 1973) (good will is a divisible asset). See also In re Marriage of Johnson, 576
P.2d 188 (Colo. Ct. App. 1977) (unpaid commissions are divisible property).
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ness. 59 To suggest that nothing related to the practice should be
considered divisible marital property would produce an unten-
able distinction between professional practices and other kinds of
commercial enterprises. 0
A second problem raised by Moss is the court's award to a
spouse who also was awarded maintenance. Although the main-
tenance award to Mrs. Moss was a limited one, the presence of
any maintenance award distinguishes the case from Inman I.
The court in Inman I was careful to point out that unless it al-
lowed Sue Inman to recover, she would be "barred from any re-
turn on... her investment." 61 Such language suggests that the
court's award was grounded in its broad equity powers rather
than upon any strict reading of the marital property statute. If
Inman awards are to be extended to instances in which a spouse
is also entitled to maintenance, the theoretical basis of such
awards will need reexamination.62
II. MAINTENANCE AND CHILD SUPPORT
A. Child Support Jurisdictional Requirements
In McCormick v. McCormick63 the Kentucky Supreme
Court ruled that the guidelines for determining whether Ken-
tucky courts should exercise jurisdiction in child support actions
are the same as those that prevail in custody modifications. 64 The
59 Attorneys and physicians commonly own real estate, libraries or other physical as-
sets of their profession. These assets may have significant value and may have been ac-
quired during the marriage.
60 But see Litman v. Litman, 8 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2691 (1982) (ethical consider-
ations preventing sale by an attorney of his or ier practice dictate that law practice is not a
divisible asset).
1578 S.W.2d at 268.
62 Cf. In re Marriage of Lundberg, 318 N.W.2d at 918. The Wisconsin court was
able to award maintenance in Lundberg because the maintenance statute was not limited
to cases of need a9d made specific reference to reimbursement for contribution to educa-
tional advances.
63 623 S.W.2d 909 (Ky. 1981).
' Id. at 910. KRS § 403.420 (Cure. Supp. 1980) establishes the basis for jurisdiction
in child custody disputes. The statute provides for jurisdiction if: 1) Kentucky is the home
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McCormicks had obtained a Kentucky divorce in 1968. Both par-
ties then moved out of state. At the time of the current action
McCormick was a Georgia resident; his former wife was a Louis-
iana resident. The Court first noted that three prior, voluntary
submissions to the jurisdiction of Kentucky courts did not estop
McCormick from claiming that Kentucky was no longer a proper
forum.6 The Court ruled that although Kentucky could provide
a forum for child support modification when there was a "fair
justification or legitimate reason" to do so, the state could refuse
to provide a forum when the contacts between the parties and
the state had become "so attenuated" that Kentucky was no
longer "even arguably" a convenient forum. 6
McCormick is an appropriate case for the use of forum non
conveniens. Mrs. McCormick had an alternative forum in her
own home state through the use of the Uniform Reciprocal En-
forcement of Support Act. Further, under that Act Kentucky's
law would not have applied because the forum is required to
apply the law of the state in which the obligor is located.6 Thus,
any interest the petitioner in McCormick had in selecting Ken-
tucky as a jurisdiction in which to litigate was outweighed by a
number of other factors.
The Court's use of the forum non conveniens doctrine
avoided the due process issue. 6" The facts of the case indicate that
state of the child and a parent of the child; or 2) if it is in the best interest of the child for
Kentucky to assume jurisdiction because the parties have a significant connection with the
state, and substantial evidence concerning the child's welfare is available there; or 3) the
child is abandoned, mistreated, abused, or neglected in Kentucky; or 4) no other state
would have jurisdiction under the prerequisites of 1), 2) or 3) above, or another state has
otherwise declined jurisdiction for a more appropriate forum. Kentucky courts have al-
ways required maximum contacts in order to support child custody jurisdiction. Turley v.
Griffin, 508 S.W.2d 765, 766 (Ky. 1974). In contrast, mimmum contacts satisfy jurisdic-
tion for the award of child support. See, e.g., Hall v. Hall, 585 S.W.2d 384 (Ky. 1979);
Ullman v. UllIman, 302 S.W.2d 849 (Ky. 1957); Benson v. Benson, 291 S.W.2d 27 (Ky.
1956); Beutel v. Beutel, 205 S.W.2d 489 (Ky. 1947).
6 623 S.W.2d at 10.
Id.
67 See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 13.1641-.1698 (West Supp. 1980).
6 See KRS §§ 407.010-.480 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
'9 623 S.W.2d at 910 n.3.
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Kentucky's continued assertion of jurisdiction would have been
constitutionally prohibited. The United States Supreme Court
has been unwilling to interpret a parent's action in allowing a
child to travel to a state as consent to the jurisdiction of that state
for matters of child support modification. 70 Such action, accord-
ing to the Supreme Court, cannot be interpreted as a "purposeful
availing" of the forum state. 71 Although Mr. McCormick had
consented to the Kentucky court's jurisdiction rather than simply
permitting his children to travel to Kentucky, the distinction is a
difficult one to make if it can be made at all. As long as the focus
of in personam jurisdiction is on the defendant's actions with re-
gard to the forum, cases like McCormick represent the outer
limits to which due process might be stretched.72
B. Trial Court Retention of Jurisdiction over Maintenance
Under the Kentucky divorce statute, either spouse may seek
maintenance but neither is automatically entitled to such an
award. 73 Instead, a spouse seeking maintenance must establish
both a lack of sufficient property to provide for his or her reason-
able needs 74 and either an inability to support himself or herself
70 Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
" Id. at 94.
72 Justice Stephens, in a vigorous dissent, argued that questions pertaining to child
support jurisdictional issues are not analogous to those involving child custody. Since the
purpose of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act is to serve as an anti-kidnapping
measure, the Act requires courts to decline jurisdiction in order to prevent parents from
surreptitiously removing their children to another state. McCormick v. McCormick, 623
S.W.2d at 911 (Stephens, J., dissenting). The best interest of the child, therefore, is served
by declining jurisdiction. In child support cases, however, the state has an interest in en-
suring adequate child support. Id. Providing a forum readily accessible to the custodial
parent seeking support was, therefore, in the best interest of the child. Id.
While Justice Stephens is correct that the jurisdictional requirements in child cus-
tody cases are intended to prevent child snatching, his argument for a state interest in pro-
viding support holds true only if Kentucky has some connection to the child. The McCor-
mick children were no longer Kentucky residents and had not been for more than ten
years. Under those circumstances, it seems inappropriate for Kentucky to claim a continu-
ing interest in the children.
Justice Stephens further stated that McCormick's prior voluntary appearances in
Kentucky courts in connection with the divorce were sufficient to satisfy due process. Id.
at 912.
73 KIS § 403.200 (Cum. Supp. 1982).
74 Newman v. Newman, 597 S.W.2d at 137, 140.
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through appropriate employment 75 or a custodial status that
makes employment outside the home inappropriate.7 6 Commen-
tators discussing the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, from
which Kentucky's statute is derived, have noted that while the
result of the statute is the greater availability of property distri-
bution between the spouses, the statute also drastically reduces
the availability of maintenance.77 Indeed, maintenance under di-
vorce statutes similar to the Kentucky statute is often called reha-
bilitative maintenance. 78 In some situations this works a relative
unfairness upon wives whb entered into lengthy marriages at a
time when both societal norms and divorce laws encouraged
their expectation of lifelong dependency.79 Kentucky courts have
been careful to recognize the problems inherent in the mainte-
nance statute and have applied it realistically. In those instances
in which economic independence is not practically possible, both
trial and appellate courts have generally refused to award only
limited maintenance. 8
Recently, the court of appeals has again shown caution in as-
sessing the realistic possibility of economic independence for a
former spouse. In James v. James8' the court upheld the trial
court's right to reserve the issue of maintenance for a spouse not
currently entitled to support but who had a history of cancer.
The James court carefully limited its holding to an instance of a
projected permanent incapacity for self-support due to an exist-
75 Casper v. Casper, 510 S.W.2d 253, 254 (Ky. 1974).
76 Richle v. Richie, 596 S.W.2d 32,34 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980); Chapman v. Chapman,
498 S.W.2d at 134, 135.
77 See generally Comment, Rehabilitative Spousal Support: In Need oj a More Com-
prehensiveApproach to Mitigating Dissolution Trauma, 12 U.S.F.L. REv. 493 (1978).
78 Rehabilitative maintenance permits an award of maintenance to aid divorced per-
sons in entering or reentering the work force. See Mertz v. Mertz, 287 So. 2d 691,692 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1973). For that reason, it contemplates payments necessary for training or
education to permit an individual to become self supporting. Robinson v. Robinson, 366
So. 2d 1210,1211 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
79 See Lindsay v. Lindsay, 565 P.2d 199 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977); In re Marriage of
Pieper, 398 N.E.2d 868 (111. App. Ct. 1979); Brueggemann v. Brueggemann, 551 S.W.2d
853 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977); In re Marriage of Madson, 590 P.2d 110 (Mont. 1978).
80 Combs v. Combs, 622 S.W.2d 679 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981), discretionary rev. denied,
(Ky. Nov. 17, 1981); Frost v. Frost, 581 S.W.2d 582, 584 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
81 618 S.W.2d 187 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981).
[Vol. 71
DOMESTIC IELATIONS
ing injury. s2 Although the age and other circumstances of the
parties, including a lengthy marriage, indicate the court's un-
willingness to interpret the maintenance statute to disadvantage
such parties,8 a note of caution should be sounded. If the former
wife in James is forced to seek maintenance because of a recur-
rence of her illness, she will be able to do so only because her
counsel was careful enough to request that the trial court reserve
the issue and did not accept a lump sum maintenance award. Re-
cent rulings of the Kentucky Supreme Court render the latter
awards final and non-modifiable. 4 For that reason, attorneys
whose clients do have serious, existing injuries must take into ac-
count the possibility of further incapacitation and request that
the trial court draft the award so that it falls outside the rule of
finality.
C. Child Support
Several technical questions concerning child support also
faced Kentucky appellate courts in the past year. Under Ken-
tucky law, either parent may be required to pay support to a
minor child of the marriage. 5 In most cases the age of majority at
the time of the divorce decree will determine when the support-
ing parent may discontinue such payments.8 6 In Weilage v. Weil-
8 2 Id. at 188. See also Newman v. Newman, 355 N.E.2d 867, 869 (Ind. Ct. App.
1976). Some courts do not require the presence of an existing illness or injury, retaining
jurisdiction if there is any possibility of health problems. Evans v. Evans, 337 So. 2d 998,
1000 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976). The requirement of an existing illness is preferable be-
cause cases in which general health concerns are paramount could be handled under more
general exceptions to rehabilitative maintenance. See generally Combs. v. Combs, 622
S.W.2d at 680.
83 James and the Kentucky cases refusing to award only rehabilitative maintenance
to spouses not capable of economic independence share a common thread. See notes 78-80
supra for a list of the cases.
84 E.g., Dame v. Dame, 628 S.W.2d 625 (Ky. 1981). See text accompanying notes
129-36 infra for a discussion of this point.
85 KRS § 403.210 (Cum. Supp. 1982).
86 The problem arises because the 1965 legislature lowered the age of majority from
21 to 18. KRS § 2.015 (1980). Kentucky appellate courts have required obligors under pre-
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age,8 7 however, the court of appeals held that an order subse-
quent to the original divorce decree that not only modified child
support but also transferred the custody of the children in ques-
tion was based upon a new contract that rescinded the earlier pa-
rental agreement incorporated into the divorce decree. The sup-
port parent in Weilage could not be required to pay support to a
child over eighteen but under twenty-one years of age because
the age of majority at the time of the subsequent agreement,
eighteen, controlled.8
Child support awards in divorce are usually based upon the
needs of the parties' minor children and technically are not an
award to the custodial parent. But the Kentucky Court of Ap-
peals in Harvey v. McGuire9 held that in an action to collect
child support arrearages after children have reached the age of
majority, the custodial parent is the real party in interest and
may prosecute the action in his or her own name.e The court
based its decision upon the fact that the custodial parent had
been required to pay the support owed by the non-custodial par-
ent and should be able to recover that amount. 91
Finally, in Stewart v. Raikes,92 the Kentucky Supreme Court
1965 decrees which state that payments would continue until majority to continue pay-
ment until minor children reach 21. Worrell v. Worrell, 489 S.W.2d 817 (Ky. 1973);
Kirchner v. Kirchner, 465 S.W.2d 299 (Ky. 1971); Collins v. Collins, 418 S.W.2d 739
(Ky. 1967); Wilcox v. Wilcox, 406 S.W.2d 152 (Ky. 1966). When decrees were silent as to
the duration of payments, however, the obligation terminated at 18. Young v. Young, 413
S.W.2d 887 (Ky. 1967). Modification of the amount of support after the 1965 amendment
did not alter the reqmrement that the obligor continue to pay until the minor child
reached 21. Showalter v. Showalter, 497 S.W.2d 420 (Ky. 1973).
87 637 S.W.2d 660 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982).
88 Id. at 611. The court's decision rests upons its conclusion that the second agree-
ment between the parties was a new contract rather than modification of part of an exist-
ing contract. If the court was correct in its application of contract principles, its decision
was consistent with its earlier rulings that parents would be held to intend payment until
the age of majority in force at the time of the contract's malang.
89 635 S.W.2d 8 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982).
" Id. at 9. The court applied the 15-year statute of limitations on judgments. Id.
91 Id. The court's conclusion that the non-obligor parent's right was based upon her
assumption of the obligor's duty avoids the interpretation that child support is owed to the
custodial parent rather than to the child.
92 627 S.W.2d 586, 589 (Ky. 1982).
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held that a mother's failure to reduce child support arrearages to
a lump sum judgment did not prevent her from collecting the un-
paid arrearages from the deceased father's estate. The decision
reflects the flexibility given to trial courts upon the death of the
obligor where child support has been awarded.3
III. PROBLEMS wiTH ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS
A number of domestic relations cases before the appellate
courts last term may profitably be classified as involving the en-
forceability of judgments. These disputes concerned recognition
of foreign equity decrees, collection of marital property division,
the finality of maintenance orders and the enforcement of sister
state custody modifications.
A. Recognition of Foreign Equity Decrees
As every student of conflicts knows, the rule of Fall v. Eastin
prohibits the courts of one state from affecting title to land'in
another state.9 In Arthur v. Arthur,95 the Kentucky Court of Ap-
peals avoided Fall's traditional prohibition by enforcing the
"equities" arising from an Indiana divorce decree.
Lois and Maynard Arthur were divorced in 1975 by an Indi-
ana court. 96 The Indiana court determined that Maynard's half
interest in a eleven-acre tract in Laurel County, Kentucky, was
$3,000. It ordered Maynard to pay fifty dollars per week for
93 See KRS § 403.250(3) (Cum. Supp. 1982).
9 215 U.S. 1 (1909). In Fall the parties were divorced in Washington. The Washing-
ton divorce court awarded Mrs. Fall an interest in real property located in Nebraska and
ordered her husband to convey that interest to her. When he failed to do so, the land was
conveyed to her by a commissioner's deed. Mr. Fall then conveyed the land to third par-
ties. When Mrs. Fall brought suit to quiet title to the land in a Nebraska court, the court
refused to give effect to the Washington commssmoner's deed. The Supreme Court of the
United States upheld that refusal on the ground that the Washington commissioner's deed
was ineffective to convey title to land situated in another state.
9 625 S.W.2d 592 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982).
96 The divorce occurred in Indiana because Maynard was serving a life sentence in
an Indiana prison. Id. Although traditional rules would indicate that Maynard could not
have acquired an Indiana domicile, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICr OF LAWS § 17
(1971) (domicile cannot be acquired by party present under compulsion), Indiana courts
apparently believed him to be a rather permanent resident. Certainly, it is unlikely that
Maynard was forum shopping.
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child support and placed a lien upon the Laurel County land to
secure the payment of the child support and required Maynard to
quit-claim the land to Lois when child support arrearages
reached the value of the half interest. In 1976 an Indiana com-
missioner's deed carried out the provisions of the court order and
was recorded in Laurel County Earlier in 1975, however, May-
nard conveyed the property to his brother, Lonnie. 97
The Laurel Circuit Court found Maynard's conveyance to
Lonnie to be fraudulent and ruled Lois to be entitled to the land
by virtue of the Indiana commissioner's deed. The Kentucky
Court of Appeals concluded that, although the conveyance be-
tween the brothers was fraudulent, Fall barred the Indiana court
from affecting title to land in Kentucky.9 It then remanded the
case to the trial court to permit a determination whether the
equities warranted conveyance of the property to Lois.
Arthur places Kentucky in that majority group of states that
enforce foreign equity decrees. 9 A rule providing for the enforce-
ment of such decrees means that, although Kentucky courts
would not give effect to a sister state's commissioner's deed, they
would permit enforcement of an order from the sister state's
courts requiring a party to give the deed. 101 The appellee's wife in
Arthur argued that an earlier decision of the court in Becker v.
Becker 01 required the court to accept the Indiana commissioner's
deed. The court of appeals correctly distinguished Becker be-
cause in that decision the Kentucky court had ordered the con-
veyance of land outside of Kentucky by a party subject to per-
9' 625 S.W.2d at 594.
9 Id. at 594-95. Although the United States Supreme Court did not state that the
Fall purchasers were not bona fide claimants, they were Fall's siblings and were likely to
have had notice of the former spouse's claim.
9 The United States Supreme Court has never ruled on whether foreign equity de-
crees are entitled to enforcement in sister states. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 102 comment c (1971). Such decrees might be enforceable under the implement-
mg statute to the full faith and credit clause, 28 U.S. C. § 1738 (1976), which requires full
faith and credit be given to the judicial proceedings of sister states. Id.
100 Kentucky would have jurisdiction to require enforcement by virtue of the land's
presence in this state. Because Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), does not apply to
post-judgment remedies, Kentucky courts need not reassess the defendant's contacts with
the state.
101 576 S.W.2d 255 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
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sonal jurisdiction within the state. 102
Taken together, Arthur and Becker place Kentucky courts in
the position of protecting any valid Kentucky interest in land
within the state while attempting to fully and fairly settle dis-
putes litigated in its court system. In a bilateral divorce such as
Becker, there is no reason for a trial court to refuse to divide the
property owned by the parties even though it is located outside of
Kentucky. A bilateral divorce cannot occur in Kentucky unless
one party has satisfied the jurisdictional requirements. 10
It is fair to assume that consent to jurisdiction indicates that
the consenting party agreed to permit Kentucky rules to resolve
the dispute. 10 4 In the face of that assumption it would be un-
reasonable for a Kentucky court to refuse to deal with property
located outside of the state. 105 Conversely, when both litigants
have appeared in a sister state's court and that court has ordered
the conveyance of a deed, it makes little sense for Kentucky to re-
fuse to enforce such an order to convey. Had the party conveyed
the deed, the conveyance would have been valid. 06 Since the
deed conveyed by the party would be valid and enforceable, no
important Kentucky interest would be upset by enforcement of
the equity decree.
10 2 Id. Becker did not and could not predict how the Kentucky litigant's refusal to
convey the land would be treated in the state where the land was located.
103 The petitioner must have been a Kentucky resident for 180 days preceding the
commencement of the action. KRS § 403.140(1)(a) (Cum. Supp. 1982).
104 It should not matter whether the residency agreement is satisfied by petitioner or
respondent. Where the petitioner is a Kentucky resident and the other spouse enters the
state for the purpose of litigation, he or she consents to the application of Kentucky rules.
Cf. Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609 (1951). Where the respondent is a Kentucky resident,
he or she has sufficient connection with the state to permit application of Kentucky rules to
marrage dissolution. But see notes 107-28 mfra and accompanying text with regard to
military pensions.
105 This result should be true even if the land were located in another state whose
rules for dividing marital property were significantly different from Kentucky rules. See,
e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800 (West 1970) (reqring equal division). Although the state in
which the land is located may have significant interests in the stability of land title within
the state, it does not necessarily have any significant interest in the distribution of assets on
marriage dissolution. Further, although the situs state would not have to enforce the for-
eign conveyance, it could not relitigate property distribution arising in a bilateral divorce.
Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948).
106 See generally Baxter, Chwe of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REv. 1,
15-17 (1963).
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B. Collection of Property Settlement Where One Party is in the
Military
Divisibility of pension benefits in general and of federal re-
tirement benefits in particular has occupied court attention at
both the state and federal level. Under the United States
Supreme court ruling in McCarty v. McCarty,'107 military retire-
ment pay remained the individual property of the military re-
tiree and was not subject to division upon divorce under state
law. Although military retirement pay had to be assigned as sep-
arate property to the military spouse, a state trial court was not
prevented from awarding maintenance to the non-military
spouse. A former spouse with a maintenance claim might enforce
that claim by garnishment of the military retiree's pay, with pay-
ment made directly to the ex-spouse.l I A spouse with a property
claim, however, could not have the claim paid directly to him or
her through use of the garnishment statute since he or she had no
cause of action under the garnishment statute. 109 In most states
McCarty was given only prospective effect. 110
Congress has now altered the result of McCarty by amending
Title X of the United States Code.'" The new legislation expands
the rights of former spouses because it permits division of mil-
itary retirement pay, entitles some former spouses to collect di-
rectly from the government and permits enforcement of property
division claims in military divorces.112 Jurisdictional require-
107 453 U.S. 210 (1981). The Kentucky Court of Appeals anticipated McCarty's
holding in Russell v. Russell, 605 S.W.2d 33 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).
10 42 U.S.C. § 659 (Supp. 1982). The garnishment statute applies only to money
held by the United States that represents an entitlement based upon renumeration. Thus,
the statute does not apply to proceeds of an insurance policy. Cf. Ridgway v. Ridgway,
454 U.S. 46 (1981).
109 A definitional section applying to the garnishment statute defined alimony to in-
clude support claims, but not those based upon property distribution. 42 U.S.C. § 662(c)
(Supp. 1982).
110 See Erspan v. Badgett, 659 F.2d 26 (5th Cir. 1981); Fellers v. Fellers, 178 Cal.
Rptr. 35 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981); In re Marriage of Mahone, 176 Cal. Rptr. 274 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1981); Braden v. Reno, 8 Fain. L. Rptr (BNA) 2041 (Idaho 1981).
111 In conjunction with the 1983 Department of Defense Authorization Act, Pub. L.
No. 97-252, 96 Stat. 719 (1982), Congress amended Title X of the United States Code by
adding to Chapter 71 a new act, the Uniform Services Former Spouses' Protection Act,
Pub. L. No. 97-252, §§ 1001-06, 96 Stat. 730-38 (Sept. 8, 1982) (codified at 10 U.S.C.S. §
1408) (Law. Co-op. 1982) (reprintedin 51 U.S.L.W 131-33 (Dec. 21,1982)).
112 10 U.S.C.S. § 1408 (Law. Co-op. 1982).
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ments in the legislation, however, will restrict the number of
courts able to make such an enforceable division."1
The legislation permits, but does not mandate, that retire-
ment pay be divided. The impact of this legislation in Kentucky
is uncertain because Kentucky courts have refused to divide non-
vested retirement benefits.14 Because military benefits do not
vest for twenty years, many spouses will continue to be barred
from a property award by the state rule."f5 Further, even in those
instances in which benefits are vested, the federal amendments
permit division of the benefits by courts of this state only if Ken-
tucky is the domicile or legal residence of the military member
for reasons other than military orders or in those cases in which
the military member consents."6 When pay is divisible, a former
spouse may collect directly from the government if he or she has
been married to the military member for at least ten years and
during the marriage the member has performed ten years of
creditable service."7 Finally, the congressional legislation directs
that McCarty not be given retroactive effect. 1 8
The legislation's jurisdictional requirements are likely to
cause interpretation problems for Kentucky trial courts. The
state divorce statute requires only that the petitioner establish
that he or she has been a Kentucky resident for 180 days preced-
ing the commencement of the action."0 The federal legislation
requires domicile or legal residence.12° Although the federal and
state requirements are not the same,' 2' a trial court's ability to
dissolve marriages should not be impeded. The traditional basis
for divorce jurisdiction is that the forum state be the domicile of
the plaintiff spouse.'22 Kentucky's statutory requirement de-
11310 U.S.C.S. § 1408(c) (4) (Law. Co-op. 1982).
"1 Light v. Light, 599 S.W.2d 476 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980); Ratcliff v. Ratcliff, 586
S.W.2d 292 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
n5599 S.W.2d at 476.
116 10 U.S.C.S. § 1408(c)(4) (Law. Co-op. 1982).
117 10 U.S.C.S. § 1408(d)(2) (Law. Co-op. 1982).
118 128 CONG. REc. H5957, 5999 (1982).
19 KRS § 403.110 (Cum. Supp. 1982).
120 128 CONG. REC. H5957, 5999 (1982).
121 Under Kentucky's 180-day residency requirement, some litigants must establish
more than domicile. Since domicile requires both physical presence and an intention to re-
main for an indefinite period of time, domicile might be established after a considerably
shorter period. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICr OF LAWS § 11 (1971).
122 Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
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mands no less. Indeed, it may require more.' Kentucky should
be able to continue to dissolve marriages under its statutory rule
even when the respondent is not a Kentucky domiciliary and is
absent from the state.124 Federal limitations apply only to proper-
ty division and not to marriage dissolutions.
Some examples will illustrate the mechanics of the federal
statute. First, assume that a spouse brings suit against a military
member who has no connection with Kentucky. If the spouse sat-
isfies the 180-day requirement, he or she should be able to pro-
cure a divorce in Kentucky. However, property could not be di-
vided nor could maintenance be awarded against the absent
spouse. 2 s If, however, the military spouse, although absent-from
the state by virtue of military duty, were a Kentucky domicil-
iary, the Kentucky court could (under federal legislation) divide
the retirement benefits and (under usual theories of personal
jurisdiction) it might award maintenance or child support
against such a spouse.123 The most difficult problem arises when
the respondent in a divorce is a non-domiciliary military member
present in Kentucky because of military service. Under these cir-
cumstances, military personnel who enter an appearance at the
divorce in order to contest maintenance and child support might
also be deemed to consent to the court's division of military re-
tirement benefits. 27 If presence sufficient for contesting mainte-
nance or child support awards requires military personnel to sub-
ject retirement benefits to division, the fear that states with no
significant connection to the military member other than mil-
123 See note 121 supra in which these added requrements are discussed.
124 Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. at 287.
125 Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416 (1957); Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541
(1948).
126 Courts of a party's domicile possess personal jurisdiction over the party. Milliken
v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940). The military member would, however, be entitled to the
protection of the Soldier and Sailor's Civil Relief Act of 1940, 50 U.S.C.S. §§ 501-91
(1976). For a case in which it is not clear that that act was invoked to protect a woman ser-
vice member, see Davis v. Davis, 619 S.W.2d 727 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981).
127 Military presence alone would not give Kentucky jurisdiction to divide benefits.
10 U.S.C.S. § 1408(c)(4) (Law. Co-op. 1982). Appearing in the action might, however,
be interpreted as consent. Id.
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itary presence could divide military benefits may be realized.12
C. Finality of Maintenance Order
As most divorce practitioners are aware, maintenance
awards can present significant problems of enforceability.12
Many of those problems have arisen in the context of interstate
enforcement.1- This term, however, the Kentucky Supreme
Court has settled an enforceability question related not to inter-
state support but to modifiability of a lump sum maintenance
award. In Dame v. Dame 13 the Court held that lump sum
awards were not subject to modification under the Kentucky di-
vorce statute. Relying on precedent from other Uniform Mar-
riage and Divorce Act jurisdictions, the Supreme Court found
Kentucky's adoption of that statute did not change prior Ken-
tucky cases holding that lump sum awards, even if paid out in in-
stallments, were not subject to modification. 3 2
Although the state divorce statute arguably favors property
division over maintenance awards,'3 Kentucky courts have been
careful to avoid the use of the statute to disadvantage spouses in
marriages of significant length who foreseeably are unable to be-
come economically independent. The non-modification rule of
Dame may inevitably lead trial courts to be even more cautious
in awarding lump sum maintenance. While caution is dictated in
128 See McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. at 234-35. Hopefully, state courts will treat
military presence in a urisdiction as sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction for mainte-
nance or child support awards. If not, the non-military spouse could seek an award by
bringing an action under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act against the
military member in his or her domicile. That action would almost certainly be resisted by
the military member under the Soldier and Sailor's Civil Relief Act, 50 U.S.C.S. §§ 501-
91 (1976). Further, evidence relevant to both maintenance and child support is not likely
to be found at a domicile where the obligor does not reside.
12 Maintenance awards may be modified on a showing of a change in circumstances
so substantial and continuing as to render the original award unconscionable. KRS S
403.250(1) (Cum. Supp. 1982).
130 Maintenance awards do not demand full faith and credit in sister states if they are
modifiable in the state of rendition. Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U.S. 1 (1910).
" 628 S.W.2d 625 (Ky. 1981).
132 Id.
133 See text accompanying notes 73-78 supra for a discussion of the limited nature of
maintenance awards.
134 See text accompanying notes 78-84 supra for a discussion of this point.
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some instances,' 3 the Dame rule should not discourage all lump
sum awards. Where there is no foreseeable reason why a spouse
cannot become self-supporting and absent other circumstances
rendering the award unfair,"' such awards serve a beneficial
function of severing economic as well as marital ties. Lower
courts should not adopt the Dame rule as a buttress for indiscrim-
inate open-ended maintenance awards.
D. Enforceability of a Sister State Custody Decree
Most problems with the enforcement of sister state custody
decrees have been ameliorated by the widespread adoption of the
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA). Nonetheless,
custody decrees from Texas, a holdout state not adopting that
Act, continue to pose difficult enforcement problems for
courts.' 7 This term, in Perry v. Perry 1- the Kentucky Supreme
Court, whose opinions have been a model of restraint on the issue
of jurisdiction to litigate child custody, ruled that a custody de-
cree from a state that had not adopted the uniform act was not
entitled to full faith and credit in Kentucky courts. While it is
clear that the Texas court rendering the modification decree
would not have had jurisdiction under the uniform act, the Ken-
tucky decision is an unfortunate one prompted by a difficult set
of circumstances. The decision is unfortunate because it is incor-
rect. The mother, who lost custody under the Texas modifica-
tion, had an opportunity to contest jurisdiction in Texas. Her
failure to do so should have made that forum's decree enforce-
able in this state.
The original custody decree in Perry was rendered in 1977,
when a Texas divorce court awarded custody of the child to his
mother' 39 Some two years later, after both the mother and the
child had moved from Texas to Kentucky, the father brought
modification proceedings in the original divorce forum. The
135 See James v. James, 618 S.W.2d at 187.
136 See text accompanying notes 79-84 supra for a discussion of circumstances when a
maintenance award should be subject to modification.
137 Texas is the only state not adopting the Act. See Freed & Foster, Family Law in
the Fifty States: An Overview As of September, 1982, 8 FAM. L. Rem. (BNA) 4065 (Sept.
28,1982).
13 639 S.W.2d 780 (Ky. 1982).
139 Id. at 781.
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Texas court found that the mother and child were subject to the
court's personal jurisdiction. 140 After the mother's Texas attorney
failed to appear at a hearing on the merits, the Texas court ruled
that she had defaulted and entered an order changing custody to
the child's father pursuant to his allegations in the hearing. The
child's mother did not appeal the Texas court decision.141 A short
time later the father moved a Kentucky court to enforce the
Texas court's modification of its earlier custody award. Before
the circuit court could hold a hearing on the enforcement of the
Texas" award, the father sought a writ of mandamus from the
Kentucky Court of Appeals to compel the trial court to give full
faith and credit to the Texas custody order. 142 The trial court de-
nied enforcement of the Texas order after hearing testimony on
the merits of the parties' claims.14 The court of appeals reversed
the trial court's order,' 4 and an appeal was taken to the Ken-
tucky Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court held that the sole issue before it was
whether the Texas decree was entitled to full faith and credit. It
ruled, however, that the full faith and credit issue was controlled
by May v. Anderson'45 and that the Texas court, which lacked
personal jurisdiction over the mother, could not cut off her right
to custody. The Court dismissed other cases relied upon by the
court of appeals as inapposite,' either on the ground that they
involved different types of appearances by defendants or on the
ground that the cited cases were not true full faith and credit
cases. 147
Conceding the Court's point that the mother's appearance in
the Texas court was a special appearance designed under Texas
Rules of Civil Procedure to permit a contest of that state's juris-
diction, the mother should nevertheless have been bound by the
140 Id. Texas courts continue to apply a theory of continuing jurisdiction in child cus-
tody cases.
141 Id. While the remedy may be of little satisfaction to a parent deprived of custody,
some action could be taken against the Texas attorney who failed to enter an appearance
and who did not preserve the jurisdictional question.
142 639 S.W.2d at 781.
143 Id.
144 Id.
145 345 U.S. 528 (1953).
146 639 S.W.2d at 782.
147 Id.
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Texas litigation because her attorney failed to contest that state's
jurisdiction and allowed that issue to be decided against her.48 A
forum court faced with an argument that the rendering court
lacked jurisdiction must determine the jurisdictional issue by ref-
erence to the local law of the rendering state. 149 If, under Texas
rules, a party who enters a special appearance but fails to defend
that appearance can be held to be before the court for all pur-
poses, then Texas did have jurisdiction over the mother. Further,
an incorrect assertion of jurisdiction by a Texas court could only
be challenged by an appeal through the Texas court system and
not by a collateral attack when the decree was sought to be en-
forced. 10 The Court's analogy to May is improper because that
case involved a party who entered no appearance in the courts of
Wisconsin. In contrast, the mother put herself before Texas
courts under the Texas special appearance rule and then failed to
contest the jurisdictional issue.
Perry is a clear example of the old saw that hard cases make
bad law. Neither the mother nor the child had resided in Texas
for more than two years. If Texas adopted the Act, its courts
would have been required to dismiss the case.' 5' The Kentucky
Court unfortunately chose to afford relief to the mother in plain
disregard for established rules of collateral attack.
IV. MARRIAGE
A. Loss of Consortium
At common law, only the husband5 2 had the right to recover
for loss of consortium. '0 Today, a majority of states, whether by
statute or case law, have extended the common law remedy to
148 See Baldwin v. Iowa Traveling Men's Ass'n, 283 U.S. 522 (1931).
149 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 105, comment b (1971).
150 See 283 U.S. at 522.
151 UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTIONAL ACT § 1, 9 U.L.A. 116 (1968).
152'"[The inferior hath no land of property in the company, care, or assistance of the
superior and therefore can suffer no loss or injury." 3 W BLACKSTONE, COMMEN-
TARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 143 (lith ed. 1791).
153 Loss of consortium means the loss of a couple's mutual rights to each other's so-
ciety, affection and companionship, including the loss or impairment of sexual relations.
Deems v. Western Md. Ry., 231 A.2d 514,517 (Md. 1967).
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wives, so they also may recover for consortium loss.'5 However,
the courts have consistently refused to extend this cause of action
to unmarried cohabitors.ss The Kentucky Court of Appeals con-
fronted the issue of whether the cause of the loss must occur dur-
ing marriage in Angelet v. Shivar. 156
The appellant, Robert Angelet, demanded judgment for loss
of his wife's services: "Her care, consideration, companionship
and society."' l The damages, however, were alleged to have re-
sulted from injuries intentionally inflicted by the wife's father
when she was a minor under his care, custody and control. 158
Angelet argued that, although his wife's injuries occurred prior
to their marriage, his damages occurred during the marriage and
therefore an action for loss of consortium was proper. 59 The
Angelet court reaffirmed, however, that "a claim for loss of con-
154 See Duffy v. Lipsman-Fulkerson & Co., 200 F Supp. 71 (D. Mont. 1961);
Cooney v. Moomaw, 109 F Supp. 448 (D. Neb. 1953); Swartz v. United States Steel
Corp., 304 So. 2d 881 (Ala. 1974); Schreiner v. Fruit, 519 P.2d 462 (Alaska 1974); City of
Glendale v. Bradshaw, 503 P.2d 803 (Ariz. 1972); Missouri Pac. Transp. Co. v. Miller,
299 S.W.2d 41 (Ark. 1957); Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 525 P.2d 669 (Cal.
1974); Hopson v. St. Mary's Hosp., 408 A.2d 260 (Conn. 1979); Gates v. Foley, 247 So. 2d
40 (Fla. 1971); Brown v. Georgia-Tennessee Coaches, 77 S.E.2d (Ga. Ct. App. 1953);
Nishi v. Hartwell, 473 P.2d 116 (Hawaii 1970); Nichols v. Sonneman, 418 P.2d 562
(Idaho 1966); Dim v. Naditch, 170 N.E.2d 881 (I1. 1960); Troue v. Marker, 252 N.E.2d
800 (Ind. 1969); Acuff v. Schmit, 78 N.W.2d 480 (Iowa 1956); Kotsiris v. Ling, 451
S.W.2d 411 (Ky. 1970); Deems v. Western Md. By., 231 A.2d at 514; Diaz v. Eli Lilly &
Co., 302 N.E.2d 555 (Mass. 1973); Montgomery v. Stephan, 101 N.W.2d 229 (Mich.
1960); Thill v. Modem Erecting Co., 170 N.W.2d 865 (Minn. 1969); Novak v. Kansas
City Transit, Inc., 365 S.W.2d 539 (Mo. 1963); General Elec. Co. v. Bush, 498 P.2d 366
(Nev. 1972); Ekalo v. Constructive Serv. Corp., 216 A.2d 1 (N.J. 1965); Millington v.
Southeastern Elevator Co., 239 N.E.2d 897 (N.Y. 1968); Clouston v. Remlinger Oldsmo-
bile Cadillac, Inc., 258 N.E.2d 230 (Ohio 1970); Hopkins v. Blanco, 302 A.2d 855 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1973); Mariam v. Nanm, 185 A.2d 119 (R.I. 1962); Hoekstra v. Helgeland, 98
N.W.2d 669 (S.D. 1959); Whittlesey v. Miller, 572 S.W.2d 665 (Tex. 1978); Moran v.
Quality Alum. Casting Co., 150 N.W.2d 137 (Wis. 1967); COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-2-209
(1974); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 167-A (1964); Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-3-1 (1972);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:8-a (1968); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 15 (West 1976); OR.
REV. STAT. § 108.010 (1979); TENN. CODE ANN. § 25-1-106 (1980); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,
§ 5431 (Cum. Supp. 1982); W VA. CODE § 48-3-19a (1980).
I For a critical analysis of the recent decisions prohibiting unmarried couples from
presenting a cause of action for loss of consortium, see Case Comment, Family Law, 69
ILL. B.J. 49 (1980). See also Comment, Loss of Consortium and Unmarred Cohabitors:
An Examination of Tong v. Joson, 14 U.S.F.L. REV. 133 (1979).
156 602 S.W.2d 185 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).
157 Id. at 185.
158 Id.
159 Id.
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sortium is directly dependent upon the marital relationship for its
existence." 60
B. Bigamy
Under traditional rules, some marriages are voidable and
others void, depending upon the strength of the societal prohibi-
160 Id. at 186. The rationale for delineating the scope of the right on the basis of mar-
ital status vanes from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. See, e.g., Wagner v. International Har-
vester Co., 455 F Supp. 168 (D. Minn. 1978); Tong v. Joeson, 142 Cal. Rptr. 726 (Ct.
App. 1977); Rademacher v. Torbensen, 13 N.Y.S.2d 124 (App. Div. 1939). Accord
Domany v. Otis Elevator Co., 369 F.2d 604 (6th Cir. 1966), cert. dented, 387 U.S. 942
(1967); Booth v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 87 S.E. 84 (W Va. 1915).
In Wagner, the couple did not even know each other at the time of the accident.
The court held that a person" "'should not be entitled to marry a cause of action."' 455 F.
Supp. at 169 (quoting Sarton v. Gradison Auto Bus Co., Inc., 42 Pa.D. & C.2d 781
(1967)). In Jocson, at the time of the car accident, the plaintiff had been living with his fi-
ancee for several months. Subsequent to the accident, the couple married and the husband
filed suit for loss of consortium arising from his wife's injuries. 142 Cal. Rptr. at 727. The
court demed recovery asserting that liability for loss of consortium cannot extend to all
foreseeable relationships, stating that 'legal causation must terminate somewhere.'" Id.
(quoting Suter v. Leonard, 120 Cal. Rptr. 110, 111 (Ct. App. 1975)). In Rademacher, the
court held that a husband who married a woman disabled as a result of a previous injury
assumed the cost of her medical care after the marriage. 13 N.Y.S.2d at 124.
In all of the aformentioned cases, the loss of consortium claim was based on acts
of negligence, whereas in Angelet the injury resulted from intentional misconduct. How-
ever, theAngelet court rejected this distinguishing factor. 602 S.W.2d at 186.
The author has found only one case where a spouse was allowed to maintain a
cause of action for loss of consortium although the injury occurred prior to the marital re-
lationship. See Sutherland v. Auch Inter-Borough Transit Co., 366 F Supp. 127 (E.D.
Pa. 1973). In Sutherland, at the time of the car accident the parties were engaged to be
married in less than a month. The damage award was therefore calculated from the date
of the marriage. Id. at 134.
The decision in Angelet v. Shivar may be inconsistent with other recent decisions
removing marital status as a consideration in determining the scope of legal rights and
remedies. See, e.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977) (rights incident to parent-
child relationship not limited to marital relationship); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)
(abortion right extends to unmarried individuals); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972) (right of privacy of unmarried individual to use contraceptives); Stanley v. Illinois,
405 U.S. 645 (1972) (cannot deny custody to father because unwed). However, consortium
loss between unmarried individuals may well be different from the situation where the
parent-child relationship is the focus.
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tion against marriage. 161 For example, incestuous marriages, 162
bigamous marriages'6 and marriages to an insane person'6 were
generally regarded in Kentucky as void. Underage marriages
were regarded as voidable. 6
In Ferguson v. Ferguson,'6 the Kentucky Court of Appeals
ruled that a 1972 legislative change overturned all distinctions
between void and voidable marriages. 6 The Ferguson court re-
jected the challenge by the decedent's only child, William, to the
appointment of the decedent's bigamous wife as the personal rep-
resentative of the estate,"' ruling that Williams could not collat-
161 A void marriage has no legal or binding force and is incapable of ratification;
third parties may collaterally attack the marriage even after the death of one of the par-
ties. A voidable marriage is one that is valid unless dissolved by the action of one of the
parties in a judicial proceeding. Although imperfect, it is not open to collateral attack. See
R. PETRILLI, supra note 16, at § 1.4. This distinction often works to deprive an innocent
"spouse" of social security benefits, workers' compensation or the financial benefit of a
share in a deceased spouse's estate.
162 Baker v. Thomas, 114 S.W.2d 1113 (Ky. 1938).
163 Rose v. Rose, 118 S.W.2d 529 (Ky. 1938).
164 Beddow v. Beddow, 257 S.W.2d 45 (Ky. 1952).
165 Mangrum v. Mangrum, 220 S.W.2d 406 (Ky. 1949).
16 610 S.W.2d 925 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980). In 1972, the Kentucky legislature enacted
KRS § 403.120 (Cum. Supp. 1982), delineating those circumstances under which a mar-
nage may be declared void by the court. The statute provides in part:
(1) The circuit court shall enter its decree declaring the invalidity of
a marriage entered into under the following circumstances:
(c) The marrtage is prohibited.
(2) A declaration of invalidity under paragraph (a), (b) or (c) of sub-
section (1) may be sought by any of the following persons and must be com-
menced within the times specified, but only for the causes set out in para-
graph (a) may a declaration of invalidity be sought after the death of either
party to the marriage:
(b) For the reason set forth in paragraph (c) of subsection (1), by
either party, no later than one year after the petitioner obtained knowledge
of the described condition.
Id. (emphasis added).
167 610 S.W.2d at 927.
168 Kentucky has adopted a statutory preference for appointing surviving spouses as
personal representatives. KRS § 395.020(1) (Cum. Supp. 1980).
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erally attack the marriage.'19 Prohibited marriages 70 may now be
attacked only within the statutory boundaries. Collateral attack
by third parties upon prohibited marriages is not permitted and a
party may attack such a marriage only within strict time limits. 171
V. PATERNITY
In Mills v. Habluetzel,172 the United States Supreme Court
struck down Texas' one year statute of limitations for paternity
actions. Although the majority opinion spoke only to the Texas
statute, Justice O'Connor filed a concurring opinion noting that
other statutes longer than one year might be subject to claims of
unconstitutionality. 173 Courts in states with statutory periods sig-
nificantly longer than Kentucky's three-year periods have held
those statutes unconstitutional.17 4 At the court of appeals level,
the Kentucky statute survived a pre-Mills state court challenge to
its constitutionality in Commonwealth ex rel. Sledge v. Mar-
shall;7 5 however, the Kentucky Supreme Court has granted dis-
cretionary review of the case.
It is unlikely that Mills will force a finding of unconstitution-
ality of Kentucky's three-year statute. The Court in Mills showed
deference to state interests in the problems of proof of pater-
nity. 7 6 The court of appeals in Marshall focused upon both proof
problems and deference owed to the three year legislatively-
created period.'7 Taken together, the Mills and Marshall opin-
ions indicate that the United States Supreme Court will respect
169 610 S.W.2d at 926. But cJ. Boone v. Gonzalez, 550 S.W.2d 571 (Ky. Ct. App.
1977) (permitting attack by spouse more than one year after marriage on grounds of
fraud).
170 Kentucky prohibits incestuous marriages, bigamous marriages, marriages to per-
sons adjudicated incompetent, under-age marriages and marriages not properly solemn-
ized. KRS §§ 402.010-.020 (Cur. Supp. 1980).
171 See note 166 supra for the text of KRS § 403.120 (Cum. Supp. 1982), relating to
the time limits and restriction on collateral attack.
-172 456 U.S. 91 (1982).
173 Id. at 102 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
174 Oregon v. Bradley, 8 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2696 (1982).
'75 No. 81-CA-974-DB, 29 KLS 3, at 2 (Ky. Ct. App. Feb. 26, 1982), discretionary
review granted, No. 82-SC-254-DG (Ky. Aug. 24, 1982).
176 102 S. Ct. at 1554-55.
177 29 KLS 3, at 3.
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Kentucky's assertion of a viable state interest in a relatively short
statute of limitations. Any broadening of the rights of illegitimate
children, therefore, will have to come from improved paternity
testing or legislative redrafting.

